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Abstract:	Eugenics	and	sociology	are	often	considered	polar	opposites,	with	the	former	seen	as	a	
pseudo-science	that	reduces	everything	to	genes	and	the	other	a	progressive	social	science	focused	
on	the	environment.	However,	the	situation	was	not	quite	so	straightforward	in	mid-twentieth-
century	Britain.	As	this	article	shows,	eugenics	had	a	number	of	important	formative	intellectual,	
institutional,	and	methodological	impacts	on	ideas	and	practices	that	would	find	a	home	in	the	
rapidly	expanding	and	diversifying	discipline	of	sociology	after	the	Second	World	War.	Taking	in	the	
careers	of	leading	individuals,	including	Alexander	Carr-Saunders,	William	Beveridge,	Julian	Huxley,	
and	David	Glass,	and	focusing	on	the	relationship	between	eugenics,	‘population	research’,	and	the	
emerging	field	of	social	mobility	studies,	the	article	highlights	the	significant	but	underappreciated	
influence	interwar	biosocial	thinking	had	on	intellectual,	scientific,	and	political	cultures	in	post-war	
Britain.	In	so	doing,	the	article	draws	on	recent	scholarship	on	the	‘technical	identity’	embedded	in	
mid-century	British	social	science,	which,	it	is	suggested,	provided	the	link	between	the	research	
under	consideration	and	the	progressive	politics	of	those	who	carried	it	out.					
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On	the	evening	of	17	February	1936,	the	biologist	and	popular	science	writer	Julian	Huxley	(1887-
1975)	stood	before	a	meeting	of	the	Eugenics	Society	at	the	Waldorf	Hotel	in	London.	He	was	there	
to	deliver	the	Galton	Lecture,	a	prestigious	highlight	of	the	society’s	calendar	and	an	annual	event	
that	had	been	established	eighteen	years	earlier	to	commemorate	Francis	Galton,	Charles	Darwin’s	
cousin	and	coiner	of	the	word	eugenics.	As	Huxley	explained	to	his	audience	–	including	his	brother,	
the	novelist	Aldous	Huxley,	and	the	Labour	MP	and	later	first	female	minister	of	education,	Ellen	
Wilkinson	–	his	lecture,	entitled	‘Eugenics	and	society’,	addressed	one	main	issue:	‘the	next	step	
towards	the	graduation	of	eugenics	into	the	dignity	of	an	established	science’.i	Julian	Huxley	argued	
that	this	process	contained	a	number	of	related	challenges.	One	was	tackling	the	misuse	of	eugenics	
in	science	and	popular	culture.	Another,	however,	was	emphasising	a	crucial	yet	frequently	
overlooked	aspect	of	the	eugenics	project.			
	
Eugenics	is	not,	as	some	of	its	devotees	have	perhaps	unconsciously	assumed,	a	special	
branch	of	natural	science:	it	is	a	branch	of	social	science.	It	is	not	merely	human	genetics.	
True	that	it	aims	at	the	improvement	of	the	human	race	by	means	of	the	improvement	of	its	
genetic	qualities.	But	any	improvement	of	the	sort	can	only	be	realized	in	a	certain	kind	of	
social	environment,	so	that	eugenics	is	inevitably	a	particular	aspect	of	the	study	of	man	in	
society.ii		
	
Huxley’s	analysis	is	intriguing	and	informative	in	equal	measure	because	it	challenges	a	
number	of	received	views	that	have	been	shaped	profoundly	by	late	twentieth-century	responses	to	
the	idea	of	applying	biology	to	society.	Given	that	Galton	derived	the	word	eugenics	from	the	Greek	
‘eugenes’,	meaning	‘good	in	stock,	hereditarily	endowed	with	noble	qualities’,	and	the	strong	links	
between	early	twentieth-century	eugenics	and	late	twentieth-century	genetic	science,	scholars	have	
paid	most	attention	to	the	leads	eugenicists	took	from	biology	and	how	their	ideas	were	
disseminated	amongst	social	and	political	scientists.iii	As	a	consequence,	observers	have	often	
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concluded	that	eugenicists	reduced	everything	they	saw	to	heredity.	Moreover,	they	have	seen	
eugenics	as	shorthand	for	opposition	to	serious	structural	reforms	to	society	and	pseudo-scientific	
cover	for	reactionary	and	conservative	political	ideas.iv	Yet	scholarship	on	eugenics	in	the	UK	and	
elsewhere	has	always	painted	a	much	more	complex	picture.	For	example,	whilst	Donald	
MacKenzie’s	pioneering	work	drew	attention	to	the	wide	range	of	political	commitments,	
underpinned	by	powerful	social	and	class	assumptions,	that	were	key	features	of	the	British	
eugenics	movement,	more	recent	studies	have	drawn	attention	to	the	important	influences	the	
social	sciences	had	on	eugenics	research	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.v		
Historians	have	often	attempted	to	make	sense	of	these	dynamics	by	distinguishing	between	
‘mainline’	and	‘reform’	eugenics.	Mainline	eugenics	is	a	label	that	has	been	attached	to	the	
scientists,	politicians,	and	social	activists	who	saw	heredity	at	the	root	of	all	social	problems,	focused	
on	negative	eugenics	–	preventing	particular	groups	of	people	from	reproducing	–	and	were	closely	
associated	with	causes	such	as	the	campaign	to	sterilize	people	whose	physical	and	mental	health	
they	believed	was	a	risk	to	the	nation.vi	Reform	eugenics,	on	the	other	hand,	has	been	used	to	refer	
to	a	reaction	against	those	ideas	during	the	interwar	years.	Emphasising	positive	measures	–	that	is,	
efforts	to	encourage	reproduction	among	specific	social	groups	–	reform	eugenicists,	including	the	
‘visible	college’	of	British	scientific	socialists,	such	as	J.	B.	S.	Haldane,	highlighted	value-laden	
assumptions	about	the	biological	origins	of	social	behaviour.	In	so	doing,	they	worked	hard	to	
articulate	more	sophisticated	models	of	nature	and	nurture	as	well	as	alternative	proposals	for	social	
reform,	including	interventions	into	and	assistance	with	human	reproduction.vii		
Whilst	Julian	Huxley’s	suggestions	sit	at	the	intersection	of	these	historiographic	tracks,	his	
argument	about	the	social	scientific	dimensions	of	eugenics	alludes	to	another	important	set	of	
developments	that	will	be	the	focus	for	this	article.	Building	on	the	work	of	scholars	including	
Richard	A.	Soloway,	Simon	Szreter,	and	Edmund	Ramsden,	the	three	sections	that	follow	explore	
interwar	research	at	the	intersection	of	biological	and	social	science	and	one	of	its	underappreciated	
legacies	for	British	sociology:	social	mobility	studies,	which	became	an	important	feature	of	the	
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rapidly	expanding	and	diversifying	discipline	after	the	Second	World	War.viii	Beginning	with	the	
eugenics	movement’s	problems	in	the	1920s	and	30s,	and	moving	on	to	the	development	of	what	
was	called	‘population	research’	at	sites	including	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	the	
Population	Investigation	Committee,	the	article	explores	how	a	group	of	researchers	with	
backgrounds	in	both	biological	and	social	science	joined	together	to	create	a	project	that	would	
answer	a	swirling	constellation	of	attacks	on	eugenics.	Simultaneously	a	criticism	and	descendent	of	
eugenics,	that	project	found	a	home	in	post-1945	British	sociology,	where	its	roots	were	gradually	
obscured,	meaning	we	now	know	little	about	the	origins	of	an	idea	that	has	become	central	to	
modern	political	discourse.						
	 These	sections	will	be	knitted	together	by	two	arguments.	The	first	concerns	the	relationship	
between	eugenics	and	quantitative	social	mobility	research,	which	will	be	shown	to	have	clear	links	
through	not	only	individuals	and	institutions	but	also	an	equally	important	set	of	ideas	that	matter	
for	our	understanding	of	both	fields,	as	well	as	biology	and	social	science	more	generally.	Simply	put,	
key	components	of	this	important	area	of	British	sociology	were	originally	forged	within	the	context	
of	the	British	eugenics	movement.	The	second	argument	concerns	the	mediatory	role	population	
research	played	in	that	process.	The	relationship	between	population	research	and	sociology	is	often	
framed	by	demography	and	the	‘political	arithmetic	tradition’	of	social	research.ix	However,	by	
drawing	on	the	work	of	scholars	including	MacKenzie	and	utilising	social	science	sources	including	
Mass	Observation	records,	Mike	Savage	has	drawn	attention	to	what	he	calls	the	‘technical	identity’	
at	the	heart	of	mid-twentieth-century	British	social	science.	In	so	doing,	Savage	has	interpreted	post-
war	British	social	science	as	a	challenge	to	old	forms	of	cultural	authority,	often	located	in	literary	
circles,	with	new	methods	such	as	the	sample	survey	being	used	to	legitimate	a	managerial	and	
technical	identity	focused	on	social	change.x	As	we	will	see,	Savage’s	technical	identity	concept	not	
only	helps	explain	why	the	interwar	British	eugenics	movement	provided	the	platform	for	social	
scientists	who	viewed	themselves	as	political	progressives	but	also	informs	our	understanding	of	the	
legacy	they	left	for	scientific	practices	and	ideas	in	British	sociology.		
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As	Pauline	Mazumdar	has	documented,	the	Eugenics	Society	experienced	a	difficult	interwar	
period.xi	After	the	burst	of	enthusiasm	that	accompanied	its	founding	as	the	‘Eugenics	Education	
Society’	in	1907,	the	society	struggled	to	find	an	identity	that	was	acceptable	to	the	different	
factions,	including	elite	scientific	and	lay	groups,	who	contributed	to	its	meetings	and	activities.	
Although	those	internal	wrangles,	which	led	the	society	to	drop	the	word	‘Education’	from	its	name	
in	1926,	were	partly	the	kind	of	teething	problems	common	to	many	new	organisations,	they	were	
also	a	product	of	bigger	questions	about	eugenics	in	early	twentieth-century	Britain.	Despite	the	
distinguished	natural	and	social	scientists,	literary	intellectuals,	and	social	activists	it	counted	among	
its	members	and	fellows	during	its	first	two	decades,	including	the	economist	John	Maynard	Keynes,	
the	writer	and	sexologist	Havelock	Ellis,	the	social	reformer	Eleanor	Rathbone,	and	the	birth	control	
campaigner	Marie	Stopes,	the	Society	had	failed	to	make	an	impact	as	wide	or	deep	as	its	founders	
had	hoped	for.	To	be	sure,	eugenics	was	widely	discussed	in	Britain	during	the	two	decades	after	the	
society	was	founded.	The	problem,	however,	was	that	by	the	late	1920s	the	society	could	claim	only	
the	1913	Mental	Deficiency	Act	as	evidence	of	progress	when	it	came	to	its	goal	of	influencing	
political	decision-making.	This	single	success	was	hugely	disappointing	compared	to	the	advances	
eugenics	seemed	to	be	making	in	other	countries,	especially	the	USA	where	well-funded	campaigns	
had	encouraged	several	states	to	introduce	significant	eugenics	legislation.xii	Leading	British	
eugenicists	wondered	what	they	needed	to	do	to	achieve	similar	success.			
Central	to	the	Eugenics	Society’s	problems	were	the	criticisms	of	eugenics	that	were	
widespread	in	early	twentieth-century	Britain.	Attacks	came	from	across	the	political	spectrum.	
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Whilst	liberals	and	conservatives	objected	to	the	violations	of	individual	rights	and	the	expansion	of	
state	powers	that	were	required	to	implement	policies	such	as	sterilization	for	‘feeblemindedness’,	
people	on	the	left,	including	the	Labour	Party,	were	concerned	social	and	economic	elites	were	using	
the	language	of	eugenics	to	naturalize	their	dominance	of	the	working	classes.xiii	Much	of	the	
criticism,	however,	came	from	within	the	ranks	of	the	eugenics	movement	itself.	Francis	Galton,	for	
instance,	worried	that	members	of	the	Eugenics	Education	Society	were	rushing	to	popularize	
scientific	ideas	he	considered	promising	but	incomplete	and,	in	the	process,	were	risking	his	
project’s	reputation.xiv	By	the	early	1930s,	the	splits	within	the	movement	had	grown	wider	as	a	new	
generation	of	biologists	turned	their	attention	to	the	relationship	between	heredity	and	society.	
Utilising	new	methods	and	ideas,	these	researchers	cast	serious	doubts	on	the	scientific	credentials	
of	the	models	many	eugenicists	used	to	explain	their	ideas	about	the	origins	of	social	problems,	
particularly	the	family	pedigrees	they	claimed	showed	everything	from	diseases	to	criminality	were	
passed	down	the	generations.xv		
Among	the	most	prominent	of	these	biologists	was	Lancelot	Hogben	(1895-1975),	a	
renowned	socialist	who	had	been	imprisoned	as	a	conscientious	objector	during	the	First	World	
War.xvi	Hogben’s	reputation	as	a	biologist	was	based	on	his	leading	role	in	the	effort	to	promote	
experimental	methods	in	biology	and	his	efforts	to	construct	a	better	understanding	of	how	genes	
and	environments	connect,	combine,	and	otherwise	affect	each	other.xvii	An	adversarial	and	often	
difficult	figure,	his	most	famous	and	important	dispute	was	with	the	biologist	and	leading	member	of	
the	Eugenics	Society,	R.	A.	Fisher	(1890-1962),	author	of	The	genetical	theory	of	natural	selection	–	a	
landmark	exposition	of	the	mathematical	relationship	between	the	previously	opposed	schools	of	
Darwinian	natural	selection	and	Mendelian	genetics.xviii	Whilst	Fisher	maintained	it	was	possible	to	
identify	the	precise	contributions	of	genes	and	environments	to	development,	Hogben	argued	the	
two	were	interdependent	in	ways	that	made	Fisher’s	judgements	at	best	unreliable	and	at	worst	
impossible.xix		
Population	and	Social	Mobility	
7	
	
Hogben’s	arguments	were	hugely	significant	for	the	way	biologists	came	to	think	about	
concepts	such	as	organism-environment	interaction	during	the	late	twentieth	century.	Yet	he	was	
also	an	effective	communicator	of	scientific	ideas	to	wider	audiences	and	became	well	known	from	
the	early	1930s	onwards	as	the	author	of	hugely	popular	books	including	Mathematics	for	the	
million	and	Science	for	the	citizen.xx	These	skills	posed	a	problem	for	the	eugenics	movement.	To	be	
sure,	lay	audiences	did	not	always	fully	grasp	the	exact	details	of	Hogben’s	arguments,	set	out	in	
books	such	as	Genetic	principles	in	medicine	and	social	science,	but	they	took	away	a	message	that	
worried	eugenicists.	As	the	sociologist	and	former	student	of	Karl	Pearson,	Alexander	Carr-Saunders,	
put	it	in	a	letter	to	C.	P.	Blacker,	the	president	of	the	Eugenics	Society,	in	1932,	
	
Do	you	realise	(a)	what	kind	of	influence	Hogben’s	book	is	having	and	(b)	how	widespread	
that	influence	is?	Does	he	realise	it?	
I	have	told	you	how	much	I	genuinely	admire	the	book.	But	(a)	he	has	emphasised	
every	point	that	tells	against	the	importance	of	genetic	differences	and	(b)	has	expressed	
some	strong	criticisms	of	eugenists	[sic].		
The	consequence	is	that	the	book	is	interpreted	as	undermining	the	eugenic	position	
–	i.e.	as	proving	that	we	need	not	bother	about	the	genetic	constitution	of	our	population.	
As	evidence	of	this	see	the	reviews	in	the	lay	press.	Also	listen	to	those	who	read	or	look	at	
the	book.	A	man	of	some	eminence	in	his	own	line,	for	instance,	who	follows	things	
generally,	told	me	that	he	understood	that	Hogben	had	knocked	the	bottom	out	of	eugenics.		
I	have	been	very	much	impressed	by	the	extent	to	which	the	book	is	exerting	its	
influence.	I	am	giving	public	lectures	here	on	Eugenics,	and	several	members	of	the	
audience,	have	at	least	heard	of	the	book.	Though	not	all	have	seen	it,	and	few	have	read	it,	
they	are	somehow	of	opinion	that	it	has	shown	up	eugenics.	
This	is	happening	just	at	a	time	when	there	is	more	public	interest	in	eugenics	than	
there	has	ever	been	before	in	my	experience.	Four	years	ago	I	gave	a	lecture,	and	got	a	small	
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audience;	each	day	this	time	people	are	turned	away.	But	just	as	the	public	is	waking	up,	the	
one	man	who	holds	an	academic	position	in	this	field	seems	to	have	given	the	whole	thing	a	
coup	de	grace.xxi	
	
	
	 In	fact,	rather	than	turning	people	away	from	eugenics,	these	issues	inspired	significant	
amounts	of	research	into	the	relationship	between	biology	and	society.	Hogben’s	own	position	
during	the	1930s	underlined	this	point.	After	spending	the	decade	after	the	First	World	War	moving	
from	job	to	job,	including	posts	at	universities	in	London,	Edinburgh,	Montreal,	and	Cape	Town,	he	
was	recruited	by	the	economist	and	social	reformer	William	Beveridge	(1879-1963)	in	1930	to	head	
a	new	department	of	social	biology	at	the	London	School	of	Economics,	of	which	Beveridge	was	then	
director.	Established	with	the	aid	of	significant	grants	from	the	Rockefeller	Foundation,	the	
department	of	social	biology	was	intended	to	explore	the	meaning	of	biological	knowledge	for	social	
policy	and	investigate	what	the	biological	and	social	sciences	could	learn	from	each	other	
methodologically.xxii	In	addition	to	Hogben	and	his	research	students,	whom	Beveridge	provided	
with	a	fully-equipped	laboratory	housing	over	1,500	animals,	the	department	of	social	biology	
employed	social	scientists,	including	the	radical	feminist	demographer,	Enid	Charles	(1894-1972),	
who	was	married	to	Hogben,	and	the	German	Jewish	refugee	R.	R.	Kuczynski	(1876-1947).			
Studies	conducted	by	members	of	the	department	of	social	biology,	whose	centre	of	
intellectual	gravity	lay	in	the	idea	that	society	–	the	human	environment	–	was	preventing	many	
people	from	realising	their	innate	potential,	illustrate	what	Hogben	and	his	allies	considered	a	robust	
response	to	mainline	eugenics.	J.	L.	Gray	and	Pearl	Moshinsky,	for	example,	worked	extensively	on	
the	relationship	between	the	distribution	of	ability	across	social	classes	and	the	opportunities	
offered	by	the	British	education	system.	In	one	study,	which	took	place	in	1933	and	1934,	they	and	
four	research	assistants	visited	schools	across	London	where	they	used	Otis	group	advanced	tests	
(form	A)	on	school	children	aged	between	9	years	and	12.6	years	old.	These	tests,	from	which	the	US	
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army	had	derived	examinations	for	recruits	during	the	First	World	War,	were	Binet	and	Spearman	
style	intelligence	tests	containing	ten	parts,	including	sections	on	verbal	memory,	numerical	
problems,	and	‘following	directions’,	which	researchers	believed	enabled	them	to	obtain	an	index	of	
intelligence	that	was	independent	of	age.xxiii	Gray	and	Moshinsky’s	aim	was	to	use	the	results	to	
answer	a	specific	question:	‘to	what	extent	does	the	existing	machinery	of	social	selection	adjust	
educational	opportunity	to	individual	ability?’xxiv	Was	it	the	case,	they	wanted	to	know,	that	every	
child	of	high	intelligence	was	able	to	continue	at	school	beyond	the	age	of	fourteen,	when	
compulsory	education	ended	in	England?	Moreover,	was	there	hard	evidence	to	justify	the	
dominance	that	privately-educated	children	had	over	university	places	and,	ultimately,	the	
employment	opportunities	that	were	dependent	on	them?				
By	combining	their	results	from	1933	and	1934	with	the	data	acquired	in	earlier	department	
of	social	biology	investigations,	Gray	and	Moshinsky	were	able	to	study	data	relating	to	over	10,000	
children	from	five	different	types	of	school,	including	a	third	of	secondary	schools,	in	London.	
Utilising	IB	(‘index	of	brightness’),	rather	than	IQ	(‘intelligence	quotient’),	measures	to	interpret	their	
test	results,	Gray	and	Moshinsky	found	that	there	were,	indeed,	higher	mean	test	scores	among	
children	whose	parents	paid	for	their	education	than	those	who	received	their	education	for	free.xxv	
Whilst	50	per	cent	of	fee-paying	children	in	their	sample	scored	an	IB	of	120	or	above,	only	25	per	
cent	of	children	in	their	sample	of	those	educated	for	free	achieved	the	same	scores.	However,	as	
Gray	and	Moshinsky	pointed	out,	such	mean	scores	were	misleading	because	they	concealed	
statistically	important	information.	In	their	case,	the	different	means	obscured	the	fact	their	sample	
of	fee-paying	children	was	3,000	whilst	the	sample	of	children	educated	for	free	was	7,000.		When	
those	figures	were	further	adjusted,	using	official	statistics,	to	represent	the	school	population	as	a	
whole,	which	was	even	more	unequally	distributed	between	fee-paying	and	freely	educated	
children,	this	meant	that	around	80	per	cent	of	the	total	number	of	children	possessing	high	ability	
did	not	attend	private	school	–	a	hugely	significant	finding	at	a	time	when	only	6.6	per	cent	of	
children	in	elementary	schools	were	offered	a	free	secondary	school	education.xxvi	
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In	their	follow-up	study	of	the	relationship	between	educational	opportunity	and	parental	
occupation,	Gray	and	Moshinsky	argued	that	social	and	economic	groups	were	self-recruiting,	
despite	the	lack	of	evidence	to	support	the	idea	that	intelligence	was	concentrated	in	the	offspring	
of	those	groups.xxvii	Indeed,	as	Gray	showed	in	a	study	co-authored	with	his	colleague	David	Glass,	
the	relationship	between	ability	and	opportunity	became	weaker	the	further	down	the	social	ladder	
one	looked.	Despite	80	per	cent	of	high-ability	children	being	found	among	the	population	who	
received	their	education	for	free,	seven	fee-payers	were	admitted	to	university	for	every	non	fee-
paying	student.xxviii	These	facts	disclosed	‘a	defect	in	our	social	organization	more	extensive	than	is	
commonly	realised’,	Gray	and	Moshinsky	argued.xxix	Indeed,	as	Hogben	put	it	in	his	introduction	to	
Gray,	Moshinsky,	and	Glass’	work,	these	facts	illuminated	British	society’s	basic	inefficiencies.	To	
have	so	many	children	of	high	ability	exit	education	for	financial	reasons	at	the	age	of	fourteen	was	
clear	evidence	of	‘biological’	and	‘social	wastage’:	biological	because	it	was	raw	ability	that	was	
being	lost,	social	because	institutions	were	responsible.xxx	
As	the	alliance	of	the	liberal	technocrat	Beveridge	and	socialist	Hogben	demonstrated,	these	
ideas	resonated	with	thinkers	of	different	political	convictions	but	they	had	particularly	strong	
connections	with	the	cross-party	planning	movement.	Focused	on	the	economic	problems	of	the	
1920s	and	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s,	members	of	the	planning	movement	believed	the	UK’s	
social	and	economic	problems	could	be	solved	by	political	reorganisation	that	handed	more	
responsibility	for	development	to	state	agencies.xxxi	An	important	part	of	this	vision	for	a	planned	
society	was	its	emphasis	on	social	and	economic	research,	particularly	quantitative	work,	which	
seemed	to	its	advocates	less	open	to	political	manipulation	than	armchair	theorising.	Quantitative	
research	promised	to	reveal	laws	of	development	that	the	state	might	accelerate	or	redirect,	helping	
it	to	modernize	Britain’s	social,	political,	and	economic	structures.xxxii			
Of	the	many	groups	associated	with	the	planning	movement,	the	most	important	was	
Political	and	Economic	Planning	(PEP),	which	was	formed	in	1931	in	response	to	an	article	published	
in	The	Week-End	Review	by	the	ornithologist	and	proto-environmentalist	Max	Nicholson,	who	later	
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served	as	Herbert	Morrison’s	most	senior	civil	servant	in	the	post-war	Labour	administration.xxxiii	
Among	PEP’s	founding	members	was	Julian	Huxley,	who	was	invited	to	bring	a	biologist’s	
perspective	to	the	problems	of	social	and	economic	planning.	This	move	made	clear	that	biology	was	
seen	as	relevant	to	planning,	not	to	mention	progressive	politics	more	generally.	Yet	members	of	the	
PEP,	like	the	members	of	the	department	of	social	biology,	were	adamant	that	much	more	work	
needed	to	be	done	on	the	relationship	between	biological	and	social	science	ideas	before	the	
political	classes	would	be	able	to	harvest	useful	knowledge	from	it.	This	cautionary	approach	did	not	
extinguish	everyone’s	hopes,	though.	On	contrary,	for	some	influential	figures	it	promised	not	only	
political	progress	but	also	to	regenerate	the	eugenics	movement.		
	
	 	
	 	
	
II	
	
Mainline	eugenicists	were	concerned	with	what	they	called	‘quality’	–	the	type	of	people	who	were	
reproducing.	Reform	eugenicists	concentrated	on	quantity.	This	interest	in	population	size	and	
dynamics,	which	had	a	history	dating	back	to	T.	R.	Malthus’	work	of	the	late	1790s	and	early	1800s,	
was	focused	on	different	problems	at	different	points	in	time.		There	were	deep	concerns	about	
over-population	during	the	late	nineteenth-	and	early	twentieth	century,	when	government	
statistics,	including	historical	census	data,	showed	the	British	population	had	grown	significantly	
over	the	previous	100	years.	By	the	1930s,	though,	social	researchers	including	Charles	and	
Kuczynski	were	arguing	those	figures	were	misleading.	Growth	had	been	driven	by	increased	life	
expectancy	but	this	would	soon	be	countered	by	declining	fertility	rates	among	the	young,	which	
Population	and	Social	Mobility	
12	
	
meant	population	decline,	perhaps	to	as	little	as	four	million	people	within	a	century.xxxiv	This	was	a	
serious	problem	that	could	threaten	the	stability	of	Britain’s	political	and	social	structures.						
A	central	figure	in	these	discussions	was	Alexander	Carr-Saunders	(1886-1966).	Although	he	
is	now	seldom	studied,	Carr-Saunders	was	one	of	his	generation’s	leading	biosocial	thinkers.	After	
reading	zoology	at	Oxford	during	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century,	he	had	studied	under	the	
biometrician	and	eugenicist	Karl	Pearson	at	University	College	London,	then	returned	to	Oxford	as	a	
demonstrator	in	zoology	after	the	First	World	War	before	being	appointed	the	first	Charles	Booth	
Professor	of	Social	Science	at	the	University	of	Liverpool	in	1923.xxxv	The	early	result	of	his	work	at	
the	intersection	of	biology,	social	science,	and	statistics,	and	the	publication	that	secured	his	
appointment	at	Liverpool,	was	The	population	problem,	in	which	he	argued	that	numbers	were	
central	to	the	study	of	populations	but	very	far	from	the	only	consideration.	Declining	and	
differential	fertility,	to	name	just	two	of	his	era’s	concerns,	were	not	simply	biological	phenomenon,	
he	argued,	but	complex	historical	changes	involving	the	interaction	of	biology,	economics,	and	
anthropology	in	social	contexts.	Declining	fertility	may	or	may	not	be	a	bad	thing,	Carr-Saunders	told	
his	readers,	but	it	could	be	reversed	only	if	they	paid	attention	to	the	social	environment	as	well	as	
the	biological	constitution	of	the	people	living	in	it.xxxvi	To	emphasize	this	point,	he	followed	up	The	
population	problem	with	pioneering	collaborative	work	on	the	structure	of	British	society	and	the	
role	institutions	played	within	it.xxxvii			
Unsurprisingly,	Carr-Saunders	was	also	a	prominent	eugenicist	–	the	author	of	the	Home	
University	Library	volume	on	the	subject	–	who	shared	his	contemporaries’	worries	about	the	
movement’s	credibility.xxxviii	As	he	told	he	told	the	Eugenics	Society	audience	who	gathered	to	hear	
his	Galton	Lecture,	‘Eugenics	in	the	light	of	population	trends’,	in	February	1935,		
	
One	day	someone	will	write	a	history	of	the	eugenic	movement.	The	historian	will	have	
some	puzzles	to	solve.	How	did	it	come	about	that	the	subject	was	ventilated	as	early	as	the	
‘sixties	of	the	last	century	though	no	real	knowledge	of	the	mechanism	of	inheritance	was	
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available	until	the	early	years	of	the	present	century?	That	we	may	attribute	mainly	to	the	
genius	of	one	man.	Sir	Francis	Galton	saw	the	importance	of	applying	our	knowledge	of	
heredity	to	social	problems;	at	the	same	time	he	did	not	fail	to	realize	that	the	knowledge	
available	in	his	day	was	very	limited.	Indeed	he	devoted	much	of	his	time	and	energy	to	the	
building	up	of	a	science	of	inheritance.	But	it	is	not	the	case	that	his	followers	have	always	
been	equally	impressed	with	the	necessity	of	postponing	the	formulation	of	policy	until	the	
relevant	facts	are	certainly	known,	and	of	this	opportunity	for	criticism	the	opponents	of	the	
movement	have	not	been	slow	to	take	advantage.xxxix	
	
Joining	up	the	Eugenics	Society’s	worries	about	its	public	reputation	and	the	discussion	
about	population	trends,	Carr-Saunders	argued	the	main	problem	was	negative	eugenics.	British	
popular	opinion	was	clearly	uneasy	when	it	came	to	policies	such	as	forced	sterilization,	whilst	his	
own	work	suggested	that	preventing	people	from	reproducing	was	a	moot	point	in	the	context	of	
overall	population	decline.	The	priority	was	a	better	body	of	empirical	evidence	that	enabled	
researchers	to	dig	deeper	into	population	trends.	Indeed,	Carr-Saunders	went	on,					
	
What	is	required	is	that	some	organization,	which	has	the	whole	population	situation	under	
review	and	desires	to	construct	an	adequate	programme,	should	examine	all	the	proposals	
made	to	deal	with	these	difficulties,	and	to	weave	them	into	a	coherent	population	policy.xl		
	
	 This	message	was	important	because	Carr-Saunders	not	only	eloquently	articulated	many	
reform	eugenicists’	thoughts	but	also	inspired	the	founding	of	the	‘Population	Investigation	
Committee’	(PIC)	in	1936.	The	PIC,	which	counted	Hogben	and	Blacker	as	members	and	elected	Carr-
Saunders	as	chairman,	came	in	to	being	at	an	important	moment.	The	six-year-old	department	of	
social	biology	was	experiencing	serious	problems	at	the	LSE	stemming	from	Beveridge’s	growing	
unpopularity	as	director,	Hogben’s	poor	relations	with	colleagues	outside	the	department,	and	the	
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Rockefeller	Foundation’s	scepticism	that	it	would	deliver	research	findings	that	could	be	translated	
into	concrete	policy	any	time	soon.xli	The	PIC	was	therefore	able	to	recruit	personnel	from	the	
department,	including	the	LSE	sociology	graduate	David	Glass	(1911-78)	–	the	son	of	a	Jewish	
immigrant	tailor	–	who	began	his	career	as	Beveridge’s	assistant	and	was	appointed	the	PIC’s	
research	secretary.xlii	Like	the	department	of	social	biology,	the	PIC	resolved	to	keep	an	official	
distance	from	the	Eugenics	Society,	developing	a	research	programme	that	was	strictly	focused	on	
population	trends	and	their	meaning	for	social	structure.	As	Blacker	and	Glass	explained	in	The	
future	of	our	population?,	a	pamphlet	setting	out	the	organisation’s	founding	aims	and	motivations,	
which	was	later	published	in	the	Eugenics	Review,	the	PIC	
	
does	not	at	present	take	part	in	propaganda	designed	to	modify	existing	population	trends.	
It	wishes,	however,	to	draw	the	fullest	possible	attention	to	the	nature	of	these	trends.	Only	
in	this	way	can	it	obtain	the	public	co-operation	and	support	which	are	necessary	in	carrying	
out	a	satisfactory	investigation	on	a	sufficiently	large	scale.xliii		
	
	 These	aspirations	stemmed	from	a	commitment	to	empirical	and	positivistic	scientific	
methodology,	which	Hogben,	in	particular,	contrasted	with	the	deductive	foundations	of	other	
systems,	including	the	free-market	economics	doctrines	espoused	by	Lionel	Robbins	and	Friedrich	
Hayek,	his	colleagues	at	the	LSE.xliv	Indeed,	Hogben	emphasized	this	point	when	he	chose	not	only	
the	William	Petty-inspired	title,	Political	arithmetic,	for	the	edited	collection	of	the	department	of	
social	biology’s	work,	which	was	published	in	1938,	but	also	a	statement	from	Beveridge,	inspired	by	
the	seventeenth-century	English	anatomist	William	Harvey,	as	the	book’s	epigraph:	‘I	profess	to	
learn	and	to	teach	economics,	politics,	sociology,	not	from	books	but	from	observations,	not	from	
the	positions	of	philosophers	but	from	the	conduct	of	mankind’.xlv		
Yet	for	all	its	aspirations	to	neutrality,	population	research	was	a	deeply	political	project	and	
eugenics	was	never	far	away.	On	the	one	hand,	the	free	movement	of	people	between	the	Eugenics	
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Society,	the	department	of	social	biology,	and	the	PIC	meant	there	were	shared	interests	and	
concerns	that	were	adapted	to	different	forums,	audiences,	and	purposes.	On	the	other	hand,	large-
scale	statistics	were	studied	and	positivistic	methodologies	deployed	within	the	framework	of	what	
Simon	Szreter	has	called	the	‘professional	model	of	social	classes’:	the	hierarchical,	five-class	view	of	
British	society,	which	was	used	for	the	first	time	in	the	General	Record	Office	of	England	and	Wales’	
Fertility	of	marriage	report,	and	went	on	to	dominate	demographic	work	during	the	twentieth	
century.	Originally	used	to	interpret	census	data,	the	professional	model	was	a	significant	departure	
from	earlier	approaches	to	social	structure	because	it	identified	status	with	work	–	that	is,	
occupation	–	rather	than	worth.	This	indicated	the	significant	debts	the	model	owed	to	the	middle-
class	social	reformers	drawn	to	both	the	statistical	and	eugenics	movements	in	the	late	nineteenth	
and	early	twentieth	centuries.xlvi			
These	points	were	illustrated	by	the	work	undertaken	by	population	researchers	during	the	
late	1930s.	Glass,	for	example,	carried	out	a	comparative	study	of	national	family	allowance	
programmes,	which	was	funded	by	the	positive	eugenics	committee	of	the	Eugenics	Society.	As	is	
well	documented,	the	merits	of	family	allowances	were	widely	debated	in	early	twentieth-century	
Britain.	Some	commentators	viewed	the	payments	as	a	positive	means	of	addressing	child	poverty	
and	improving	nutrition,	others	as	a	tool	to	encourage	fertility	either	overall	or	in	particular	
socioeconomic	groups,	whilst	some	labour	organisations	argued	unscrupulous	employers	might	use	
the	allowances	to	reduce	wages.	In	some	quarters,	including	the	Eugenics	Society,	which	only	threw	
its	support	behind	family	allowances	under	Blacker’s	reforming	leadership	during	the	1930s,	there	
were	concerns	about	their	potential	dysgenic	effects.xlvii	However,	as	population	researchers	were	
quick	to	point	out,	there	was	little	empirical	evidence	to	support	any	of	these	claims.		
Glass	intended	to	address	this	deficiency	by	travelling	to	mainland	Europe	to	gather	
statistical	information	on	family	allowance	schemes	implemented	by	industrial	employers	in	France	
and	governments	in	Italy	and	Germany.	Although	each	of	those	schemes,	along	with	others	pursued	
in	Scandinavia,	had	different	motivations,	with	some	aimed	at	workers’	welfare	and	others	focused	
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on	reproduction	among	particular	ethnic	groups,	they	all	provided	opportunities	to	observe	the	
relationship	between	the	payments	and	subsequent	family	sizes.	Glass’	main	finding,	published	in	his	
book,	The	struggle	for	population,	as	well	as	articles	in	the	Eugenics	Review,	which	formed	the	basis	
of	his	landmark	monograph	of	1940,	Population	policies	and	movements	in	Europe,	was	that	family	
allowances	had	a	negligible	effect	on	fertility	rates.xlviii	Only	Germany	experienced	a	short	increase	in	
fertility	after	the	policy	was	implemented.	Even	that	increase	could	be	attributed	to	other	factors,	
though,	such	as	an	increase	in	the	marriage	rate	shortly	before	family	allowances	were	introduced.xlix	
Whatever	they	might	be,	family	allowances	were	neither	dysgenic	nor	the	answer	to	the	population	
problem.											 		
The	desire	of	some	population	researchers	to	transform	findings	such	as	these	into	policy	
proposals	was	strong,	but	most	agreed	with	Carr-Saunders	that	impartiality	and	objectivity	were	
central	to	the	project	he	had	described	to	the	Eugenics	Society	in	1935.	It	was	for	this	reason	the	
Population	Policies	Committee	(PPC)	was	formed	by	PEP	and	PIC	as	a	joint	enterprise	in	1938.	The	
PPC	counted	Blacker,	Glass,	and	PEP’s	Max	Nicholson	among	its	members	and	was	administrated	by	
its	secretary,	François	Lafitte,	who	would	make	his	name	by	exposing	the	British	government’s	
internment	of	political	refugees	during	the	early	stages	of	the	Second	World	War	and	would	later	be	
appointed	to	a	chair	of	social	policy	at	the	University	of	Birmingham	and	serve	as	chairman	of	the	
British	Pregnancy	Advisory	Service.l	The	committee’s	aims	were	‘(1)	to	survey	the	social	and	
economic	conditions	which	discourage	the	adequate	replacement	of	eugenically	sound	stocks;	and	
(2)	to	examine	and	report	on	proposals	for	raising	the	fertility	of	healthy	stocks	in	different	
occupational	groups’.li	Whilst	this	framework	revealed	the	ostensibly	neutral	population	research	
project’s	underlying	motivations	and	concerns,	it	also	provided	an	outlet	for	discussions	that	could	
not	be	hosted	by	the	PIC,	particularly	the	more	radical	arguments	in	favour	of	greater	state	
involvement	in	education	and	health	that	some	commentators	drew	from	Carr-Saunders’	and	
Huxley’s	focus	on	the	social	environment.		
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The	wind	was	taken	out	of	the	PPC’s	sails	almost	immediately	when	scientists,	particularly	
those	with	statistical	and	administrative	skills,	including	Glass	and	Nicholson,	were	called	up	to	work	
on	problems	within	the	war	economy.	Population	research	did	not	disappear,	either	as	a	scientific	or	
political	concern,	though.	On	the	contrary,	the	appointment	of	a	Royal	Commission	on	Population	in	
1944	‘to	examine	the	facts	relating	to	the	present	population	trends	in	Great	Britain;	to	investigate	
the	causes	of	these	trends	and	to	consider	their	probable	consequences;	[and]	to	consider	what	
measures,	if	any,	should	be	taken	in	the	national	interest	to	influence	the	future	trend	of	
population’,	confirmed	population	research’s	agenda	was	part	of	the	conversation	when	thoughts	
turned	to	post-war	reconstruction.lii	Moreover,	with	Carr-Saunders	invited	to	serve	as	a	
commissioner	and	bodies	including	the	Eugenics	Society,	PEP,	and	PIC	contributing	to	the	
commission’s	work,	including	a	new	fertility	survey	carried	out	by	Glass	and	Eugene	Grebnik,	the	
Royal	Commission	helped	population	researchers	find	a	foothold	in	the	uncertain	post-war	
landscape.liii	Yet	in	the	context	of	new	government	commitments	to	the	social	sciences	after	the	
Second	World	War,	population	researchers	did	not	find	themselves	restricted	to	the	field	that	bore	
that	name.		
	
	
	
III	
	
The	LSE’s	department	of	social	biology	and	the	PIC	were	established	when	there	were	limited	
opportunities	within	British	universities	for	social	researchers	who	identified,	and	whom	we	might	
now	identify,	as	sociologists.	Contrary	to	received	views,	British	scientists,	social	commentators,	and	
politicians	had	been	immensely	enthusiastic	about	sociology	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	
twentieth	centuries	and	the	first	British	chairs,	journal,	and	society	for	sociology	were	established	at	
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around	the	same	time	as	those	in	France,	Germany	and	the	USA.liv	There	was	little	further	
institutional	expansion	in	the	UK	before	World	War	Two,	however,	with	just	one	dedicated	sociology	
department,	at	the	LSE,	and	three	departments	in	total	–	at	the	LSE,	Liverpool,	and	Bedford	College,	
London	–	hosting	sociology	in	broader	social	science	contexts	before	1939.	All	this	was	to	change	in	
subsequent	decades.	By	the	late	1960s,	there	were	chairs	of	sociology	at	twenty-eight	universities	
and	the	Social	Science	Research	Council,	the	forerunner	of	today’s	Economic	and	Social	Research	
Council,	had	been	established.	There	are	numerous	well-known	narratives	attached	to	that	period	of	
expansion,	which	sociologists	consider	the	discipline’s	golden	age.	Yet	few	acknowledge	its	
connections	with	the	biosocial	research	of	the	interwar	years.lv			
	 Given	the	field	expanded	so	rapidly	during	post-war	reconstruction	and	within	the	expanded	
university	system	created	after	the	Robbins	Report	in	1963,	it	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	British	
sociology	is	usually	understood	in	terms	of	the	political	priorities	of	the	1950s	and	60s.	One	often-
quoted	statement	to	this	effect	is	the	French	sociologist	and	public	intellectual	Raymond	Aron’s	
reputed	assertion	that	British	sociology	was	‘essentially	an	attempt	to	make	intellectual	sense	of	the	
political	problems	of	the	Labour	Party’.lvi	This	idea	makes	much	sense	in	light	of	the	proliferation	of	
studies	relating	to	poverty,	class,	and	equality	after	1945,	not	to	mention	the	presence	of	
sociologists	in	politics	and	government:	from	Michael	Young,	the	wartime	director	of	PEP,	who	took	
the	lead	in	the	writing	of	Labour’s	1945	manifesto,	Let	us	face	the	future,	to	A.	H.	Halsey,	who	served	
as	advisor	to	the	Labour	education	secretary	Anthony	Crosland	during	the	1960s.	Yet	the	close	
identification	of	sociology	with	the	welfare	state	established	in	the	wake	of	Beveridge’s	Social	
security	and	allied	services	report	in	1942	and	the	‘White	Paper	chase’	of	1944	often	produces	a	
particularly	narrow	perception	of	the	field.		
As	Mike	Savage	has	argued,	broadening	our	understanding	of	British	sociology’s	
development	requires	paying	closer	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	it	was	entwined	with	particular	
social	and	class	identities.lvii	Located	between	C.	P.	Snow’s	two	cultures	of	natural	science	and	
literature,	sociology	appealed	to,	and	was	largely	pursued	by,	the	lower	middle	classes	who	were	
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drawn	to	scientific	rather	than	gentlemanly	high	literary	culture.	Post-war	British	sociology	was	not	
simply	quantitative	and	empirical,	it	was	managerial,	technocratic,	and	frequently	positivistic,	with	
sociologists	seeing	their	emerging	field	as	a	distinctly	modern	enterprise	embodying	progressive	
values,	both	methodologically	and	substantially.	As	George	Steinmetz	has	suggested,	British	
sociology’s	association	with	a	particular	vision	of	modernity	meant	it	thrived	in	the	post-war	context	
of	decolonisation,	where,	along	with	economics	and	political	science,	it	found	favour	with	Colonial	
Office	officials	as	they	turned	towards	policies	of	developmentalism	and	local	government.lviii	For	
these	reasons,	British	sociology	was	as	much	part	of	warfare	state	David	Edgerton	has	described	as	it	
was	the	welfare	state.lix		
The	trajectory	of	interwar	biosocial	science	and	population	research	was	deeply	entangled	
with	these	post-war	developments.	Whilst	Kuczynski	produced	a	demographic	survey	of	the	
colonies,	funded	by	the	Colonial	Office,	Glass	served	on	the	Colonial	Social	Science	Research	
Council’s	(CSSRC)	‘Standing	committee	on	anthropology’.	Carr-Saunders	was	the	chairman	of	the	
CSSRC,	the	first	social	science	funding	body	of	its	kind,	when	it	was	founded	in	1944;	a	member	of	
the	Asquith	Commission	on	higher	education	in	the	British	colonies,	which	was	convened	in	1943;	
and	chair	of	the	Senate	committee	that	organized	the	relationship	between	the	University	of	London	
and	colonial	universities	and	colleges.lx	Moreover,	there	were	strong	intellectual	continuities	
between	the	work	carried	out	during	the	interwar	years	and	research	produced	in	sociology’s	years	
of	expansion.	Particularly	instructive	in	this	respect	is	Social	mobility	in	Britain:	a	landmark	study,	
published	in	1954	and	led	by	Glass,	who	was	appointed	to	a	chair	of	sociology	at	LSE	in	1948	and	
succeeded	Ginsberg	as	Martin	White	Professor	of	Sociology	in	1961.	As	Glass	explained	in	his	
preface,	Social	mobility	in	Britain	had	numerous			
	
obligations	to	Professor	Lancelot	Hogben.	Professor	Hogben	was	not	associated	with	our	
research	and	is	in	no	way	responsible	for	our	faults.	But	our	approach	to	the	study	of	social	
selection	and	differentiation	has	clearly	been	influenced	by	the	investigations	which	he	
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promoted	before	World	War	II	in	the	Department	of	Social	Biology,	the	London	School	of	
Economics.	It	gives	me	great	pleasure	to	acknowledge	that	fact,	especially	as	I	myself	had	
the	privilege	of	working	in	Professor	Hogben’s	department.lxi		
	
	 Like	Political	arithmetic,	Social	mobility	in	Britain	was	a	large	collaborative	project,	involving	
12	contributors,	who	used	empirical	and	statistical	research	methods	to	produce	a	series	of	studies	
of	Britain	linked	by	a	common	theme.	Glass’	project,	which,	like	the	department	of	social	biology,	
benefitted	from	Rockefeller	Foundation	funding,	was	carried	out	with	an	eye	on	how	its	findings	
might	aid	government,	particularly	when	it	came	to	formulating	education	policy	after	the	1944	
Education	Act.	Yet	Glass’	project	owed	bigger	but	less	obvious	debts	to	Hogben,	the	department	of	
social	biology,	and	the	broader	culture	of	population	research.	The	very	concept	of	social	mobility	–	
a	prominent	issue	in	late	twentieth-century	British	sociology	–	was	also	a	product	of	the	context	that	
had	created	population	research.		
	 As	Glass	noted	in	Social	mobility	in	Britain,	whilst	his	own	project	was	the	first	
comprehensive	study	of	social	mobility	in	the	UK,	there	was	only	one	other	and	in	many	ways	very	
different	substantial	work	on	the	subject:	the	Russian-American	sociologist	Pitirim	Sorokin’s	Social	
mobility,	published	in	1927.lxii	Although	the	mid-Victorian	era	had	seen	a	small	boom	in	self-help	
philosophy	and	literature,	most	famously	the	writings	of	Samuel	Smiles,	the	ideas	about	self-reliance	
and	thrift	put	forwards	in	those	works	were	far	removed	from	the	fine-grained	understanding	of	
social	structure	and	sifting	characteristic	of	modern	social	mobility	studies.	The	absence	of	a	
coherent	understanding,	explanation,	or	justification	of	the	processes	through	which	individuals	
either	climbed	up	or	fell	down	the	social	ladder	was	partly	due	to	the	dearth	of	easily	computable	
data,	reflected	in	the	static	rather	than	dynamic	accounts	that	typified	nineteenth-century	social	
surveys.	It	was	also	a	consequence	of	social	scientists	operating	with	different	understandings	of	
social	mobility.	Many	pre-war	social	investigators	understood	social	mobility	in	terms	of	geographic	
or	spatial	mobility	–	the	ability	of	workers	to	relocate	for	employment.lxiii	This	was	linked	to	the	
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strong	British	tradition	of	political	economy,	in	which	thinkers	such	as	Alfred	Marshall	emphasized	
the	importance	of	mobility,	both	spatial	and	occupational,	for	economic	efficiency,	and	was	perhaps	
an	unsurprising	assumption	given	the	importance	of	urban	migration	to	economic	growth	during	the	
nineteenth	century.lxiv		
The	absence	of	questions	about	social	mobility	from	sociological	investigation	in	the	UK	
before	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	has	seldom	been	considered.	One	plausible	
argument	is	that	the	concept	was	at	best	overlooked	and	at	worst	incompatible	with	the	Spencerian	
evolutionism	that	dominated	early	British	sociology	through	L.	T.	Hobhouse	and	Patrick	Geddes,	two	
of	the	era’s	dominant	thinkers.	In	those	largely	organicist	and	frequently	functionalist	
interpretations	of	society,	the	focus	was	on	groups	and	types	in	the	context	of	social	differentiation	
brought	about	by	evolution,	with	Geddes,	in	particular,	arguing	humans	existed	in	a	symbiotic	
relationship	with	their	environments.lxv	Given	that	Morris	Ginsberg,	Hobhouse’s	disciple	and	
successor	at	LSE,	published	one	of	the	first	empirical	studies	of	social	mobility,	that	explanation	is	far	
from	perfect.lxvi	Nevertheless,	the	interpretation	does	convey	important	elements	of	truth.	This	
much	is	clear	from	British	sociology’s	strong	connections	with	social	policies	such	as	the	national	
minimum,	which	aimed	to	raise	up	entire	deserving	classes,	rather	than	specific	individuals,	during	
the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.lxvii			
	 In	these	respects,	it	was	the	questions	and	styles	of	thought	associated	with	1930s	
population	research	that	facilitated	new	understandings	of	social	mobility.	Having	accepted	and	built	
on	the	professional	model	of	social	class,	population	researchers	helped	create	a	hierarchical	view	of	
British	society	that	served	as	the	framework	for	post-war	sociologists	who	investigated	and	defined	
concepts	to	suit	their	wider	social	reform	aspirations.	When	it	came	to	social	mobility,	those	goals	
owed	much	to	population	researchers’	engagement	with	eugenics;	in	particular	the	effort	to	
challenge	hard-hereditarian	and	‘mainline’	eugenics	and	develop	an	alternative	account	in	which	
existing	social	structures	were	maladjusted	to	the	distribution	of	ability	throughout	the	British	
population.	Underpinning	this	idea	was	a	belief	common	to	progressives	of	the	interwar	period,	such	
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as	the	LSE-based	economic	historian	and	socialist	R.	H.	Tawney,	that	what	was	important	was	not	
complete	equality	between	individuals	but	structures	that	made	for	an	open	and	fair	society.lxviii	
More	than	anything	else,	this	belief	in	the	importance	of	openness	facilitated	the	growth	of	social	
science	research	into	social	mobility,	which	did	not	challenge	hierarchical	societies	so	much	as	it	
emphasized	the	importance	of	people	genuinely	deserving	to	be	in	the	place	they	found	themselves	
in	society.	This	idea	had	its	roots	in	population	research,	which	provided	a	space	for	researchers	who	
believed	positivistic	social	research	should	be	the	basis	of	policy	making	and	who	aimed	to	create	a	
social	structure	that	helped	individuals	rise	and	fall	according	to	ability	and,	through	this,	better	
served	the	interests	of	the	country	as	a	whole.	
	 As	Andrew	Miles	has	observed,	these	ideas	and	values	were	clear	for	everyone	to	see	in	
Glass’	Social	mobility	in	Britain.lxix	Setting	out	the	rationale	underpinning	the	various	studies	in	the	
collection,	Glass	explained	that		
											
There	are	two	primary	reasons	for	wishing	to	see	the	possibility	of	high	social	mobility	in	a	
community.	First,	in	order	to	increase	economic	and	social	efficiency,	since	with	a	fluid	social	
structure	there	is	more	likelihood	that	positions	requiring	high	ability	will	in	fact	be	held	by	
individuals	who	possess	high	ability.	A	fluid	social	structure	is	also,	on	that	account,	more	
capable	of	adapting	itself	to	internal	and	external	change.	Secondly,	from	the	point	of	view	
of	the	individual,	social	mobility	should	ensure	that	there	are	fewer	square	pegs	in	round	
holes,	and	the	existence	of	opportunity	to	rise	in	status	will	in	any	case	provide	an	incentive	
for	the	fuller	utilization	of	a	person’s	capacities.	There	may,	as	a	consequence,	be	less	feeling	
of	personal	frustration	and	a	greater	possibility	of	social	harmony.	Indeed,	even	if	there	is	
little	actual	opportunity	to	rise	social	status,	the	belief	in	a	myth	of	opportunity	may	produce	
similar	results;	and	perhaps	part	of	the	pride	which	Americans	feel	in	their	‘open’	society	
derives	more	from	the	image	of	nineteenth-century	U.S.A.	than	from	any	exceptional	
present	reality.	Certainly	it	is	one	of	the	postulates	of	a	democratic	and	egalitarian	society	
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that	ability,	whatever	its	social	background,	shall	not	be	denied	the	chance	to	fulfil	itself…	
We	need	to	encourage	mobility	for	the	advantages	it	offers	to	individuals	and	to	society;	but	
we	also	need	to	avoid,	as	far	as	possible,	such	disadvantages	as	may	follow	from	having	a	
social	structure	in	which	the	status	relationship	between	individuals	in	successive	
generations	will	be	far	less	stable	than	at	present	or	during	the	past	half-century.lxx		
	
	
	
IV	
	
Social	mobility	is	one	of	British	sociology’s	most	enduring	concepts,	emerging	as	an	object	of	
widespread	interest	after	1945	alongside	a	new	set	of	terms,	such	as	‘meritocracy’,	which	expressed	
the	normative	values	it	was	associated	with.	Not	only	was	social	mobility	the	subject	of	some	of	the	
field’s	most	famous	post-1945	investigations,	including	the	Nuffield	Study,	begun	at	Oxford	by	John	
Goldthorpe,	a	former	student	of	Glass’s,	in	the	early	1970s,	it	was	also	a	phenomenon	that	many	
sociologists	working	in	the	UK	during	that	period	experienced.lxxi	Yet,	as	an	expression	of	a	particular	
set	of	technical	values	focused	on	the	importance	of	adjusting	social	structures	to	suit	those	judged	
to	be	in	possession	of	high	ability,	social	mobility	was	also	the	subject	of	criticism.	Indeed,	Michael	
Young	originally	popularized	the	word	‘meritocracy’	as	part	of	a	satirical	critique	of	the	increasingly	
influential	vision	of	modern	Britain	associated	with	Glass	and	others,	which	reflected	a	growing	
diversity	in	sociology	in	the	UK	from	the	1950s	onwards.lxxii	Notwithstanding	such	criticisms,	which	
have	had	the	strongest	influence	in	the	sociology	of	education,	social	mobility	has	continued	to	
command	attention	in	British	sociology	and	been	a	central	concern	in	British	politics	into	the	early	
twenty-first	century,	even	if	the	definitions	of	social	mobility	that	politicians	use	are	somewhat	
narrower	than	the	ones	social	scientists	have	developed.lxxiii							
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	 Post-Second	World	War	social	mobility	research’s	roots	in	interwar	population	research,	and	
in	particular	the	relationship	between	population	research	and	eugenics,	is	therefore	highly	
significant.	In	many	ways,	those	roots	should	not	surprise	us.	Whilst	social	mobility	researchers	were	
concerned	that	society	wasted	much	of	the	talent	at	its	disposal,	the	reform	eugenics	movement	
that	began	in	the	1920s	highlighted	the	risks	of	drawing	incorrect	conclusions	about	a	person’s	
innate	ability	from	their	position	in	the	social	structure.	Such	points	of	intersection	not	only	throw	
light	on	the	complex	origins	of	our	understandings	of	social	mobility,	they	also	illuminate	the	deep	
connections	between	eugenics	and	modernity.	Although	we	frequently	think	of	eugenics	as	
reactionary	or	conservative	in	its	aims	and	associations,	the	researchers	who	endeavoured	to	forge	a	
new	project	under	the	name	population	research	saw	themselves	as	progressives	and	were	clearly	
possessed	by	the	technical	identity	that	underpinned	the	work	during	sociology’s	post-war	
expansion.	Indeed,	as	Glass	put	it	in	response	to	questions	about	education,	‘we	must	not	“take	the	
world	as	we	find	it”	and	ground	our	educational	system	in	the	existing	social	structure.	In	the	
schools,	as	in	the	wider	society	of	which	they	are	a	part,	we	must	deliberately	make	that	closer	
community;	it	will	not	create	itself’.lxxiv	
	 In	a	broader	sense,	work	in	these	areas	should	also	throw	light	on	the	potential	and	growing	
collaboration	between	history	and	sociology.	Mike	Savage’s	efforts	to	reuse	the	raw	materials	of	
mid-twentieth-century	social	science	studies	have	been	central	to	recent	moves	towards	
reconnecting	the	two	fields,	not	just	in	the	sense	of	making	sociology	relevant	to	historians	but	also	
demonstrating	how	historical	skills	and	practices	might	address	aspects	of	what	has	been	called	the	
‘coming	crisis	of	empirical	sociology’.lxxv	Building	on	Savage’s	investigative	models,	one	way	of	
furthering	the	links	between	history	and	sociology	might	be	for	historians	to	return	to	the	raw	data	
and	results	of	mid-	and	late	twentieth-century	social	mobility	studies	in	order	to	understand	more	
about	how	individuals	actually	experienced	social	mobility	during	that	period.lxxvi	As	this	paper	has	
shown,	an	important	contribution	to	such	a	project	should	be	a	reflection	on	the	historical	
dimensions	of	the	concepts	that	sociologists,	historians,	and	politicians	use.	Whilst	it	is	easy	to	take	
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the	stability	of	a	modern	concept	such	as	social	mobility	for	granted,	its	meaning	has	changed	in	
subtle	but	important	ways	that	are	important	for	our	understanding	of	what	social	scientists,	
reformers,	and	politicians	have	understood	and	continue	to	understand	themselves	as	trying	to	
achieve.											
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